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On Copyright’s Communications Policy
Tim Wu†
Introduction
There is something for everyone to dislike about early twenty-first century
copyright. Owners of content say that new and better technologies of
infringement have made it too easy to copy expressive works. Easy copying, they
say, threatens the basic incentive to create new works; hence, new rights and
remedies are needed to “restore the balance.” Most academic critics complain,
instead, that a newly enlarged copyright and new mechanisms of technological
self-help give content owners unprecedented levels of control over content. This,
in one version of the argument, threatens the creativity and progress that
copyright is supposed to foster;1 in another, it represents an “enclosure
movement” that threatens basic freedoms of expression.2 Copyright, these critics
argue, has overgrown its proper boundaries. The balance, again, must be
restored.
What these arguments have in common is a focus on copyright’s “authorship”
function. Copyright policy must balance incentives and access costs to effectuate
one of various constitutional goals: progress of science,3 democratic governance4
or the system of free expression.5 Few disagree that these are the goals: the main
disagreement is over what means serve these ends.
Yet the recent history of copyright asks whether such a debate can really
capture what has gone wrong with copyright. The incentives debate has proved
indeterminate. Both owners and their critics claim a tragedy of authorship. Yet
both have difficulty demonstrating empirically that the engines of creativity has
been quelled by either piracy or overprotection. At a theoretical level, any
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See generally, Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas (2001).
2
See generally Yohai Benkler, Free As The Air To Common Use: First Amendment
Constraints On Enclosure of The Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 354 (1999).
3
As expressed in the copyright clause itself. U.S. Const. Art. §8.
4
See Neil Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 Yale L.J. 283 (1996).
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putative change in copyright protection defended as necessary to preserve
incentives to create, and attacked as unnecessary control.6
I suggest today’s malaise is poorly described as a tragedy of authorship or a
failure of incentives. It is better understood, I suggest, as a failure of copyright’s
communications policy. The effort to link every dissatisfaction to sympathetic
conceptions of authorship or concerns about free expression obscures what
copyright is doing as a matter of communications policy. The real question
should be this: do stronger or weaker rights better promote the goals of
promoting innovation, competition, and access to new communications
technologies? This is not to say that the debate over authorship is nothing but a
sham. It is to say, rather, that there are questions that authorship theories cannot
answer. The purpose of this is to stress possibilities and benefits of a
communications-centered copyright theory.
What I propose is to take copyright’s role in communications policy seriously,
and takes a modular approach to understanding the functions of copyright. We
should, I suggest, explicitly recognize that copyright comprises distinctive
authorship and communications regimes, whose function can often be
independent. Stated otherwise, copyright regulates the dynamic relationships
both between: (1) authors, new and existing, and (2) communications
technologies, incumbent and challenger. The first regime is the familiar system
that grants a balance of exclusive rights to encourage creativity. The second is a
messier regulatory regime, premised largely on industry-specific liability rules,
immunities and special accommodations.
The payoff from this approach is both analytic and descriptive. Analytically,
it improves the prospects for understanding and criticizing copyright. It enlists
the tools of communications and competition policy to examine copyright’s de
facto communications regime. Copyright’s assignment of rights has a clear effect
on the conditions of competition for rival disseminators. We should understand
the goal of the communications function of copyright as those of national
communications policy: promoting competition, and innovation, and access in
new communications technologies. Second, the modular model is a better
descriptive fit with both the existing copyright code and the particular history of
20th century copyright. Much of the existing copyright code is very difficult to

6

Access costs is used here to mean (1) any costs a potential new author would incur to access
materials necessary to creating a new work, such as licensing fees and the transaction costs of
licensing, along with (2) deadweight loses that are a consequence of the market power created
by copyright.
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describe as a device for providing incentives to create new works.7 That
description may fit various “core” doctrines that consume the bulk of scholarly
attention, such as the idea / expression dichotomy,8 term limits,9 and parts of the
fair use doctrine.10 But the copyright code is also full of industry specific
immunities, compulsory licensing schemes, and other accommodations. The link
to authorship in such sections is unclear at best. I suggest it will be useful to
take these as a separate communications regime, occupied with the management
of challenger and incumbent dissemination industries.
The 20th century history of copyright shows that copyright has in fact played
a nuanced and recurring role in managing competition between incumbent and
challenger disseminators on numerous occasions. These include the conflicts
between cable and broadcast, photocopiers and publishers, the early recording
players and sheet music publishers, and others. In the main, copyright has
sought to end such conflicts with specific statutory settlements mediated by
various players.
All of this, I suggest, reveals a copyright that theorists hardly know. It is not
that scholars are unaware of copyright’s role in communications policy—it is that
the focus on incentives for authors or freedom of expression leaves little basis to
evaluate or criticize copyright’s communications policy. A closer look reveals a
copyright system that was once sensitive to its role in communications regulation,
but that has since lost nearly any conception of that role.
The study of copyright’s communications policy reveals copyright as the
embodiment of a theory of innovation and competition that has grown strongly
into disfavor in the communications field. Namely, the rhetoric of authorship
leads incidently to a model that puts the incumbent rights-holder in a supervisory
role over future technological innovation. Such approaches to innovation, while
historically popular, are today mostly discredited. They have suffered under the
criticisms of evolutionary theorists in the economic literature and the obvious
success of non-centralized innovative models. Unfortunately, under copyright,
the stewardship model of innovation enjoys a tenure protected by its
inobviousness.
7

This fact is not unnoticed among some scholars, who have with some success attempted to
supplement the incentives account with various secondary theories, such as evidentiary
functions. See, e.g., Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as A Rule of Evidence (working paper,
2002); Richard Posner & William Landes, Intellectual Property Chapter 3-7 (forthcoming
2003).
8
Embodied in 17 U.S.C. §102(a).
9
See Copyright Term Extension Act.
10
17 U.S.C. §107.
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This paper wants to recognize what copyright does in the communications
field, as the first step toward asking whether that is the kind of communications
policy we want. This paper is organized as follows. Part I makes the case
against author-centric theories of copyright, and shows that such theories can
lead to an incumbent-favoring communications policy. Part II makes a
descriptive claim: that much of the copyright law and its institutional structure
are in fact an under-theorized communications regime. Part III, finally, shows
how copyright’s communications policy has functioned in the 20th century.
Part I:
Author--Centrism
Against Author
Copyright theory is often depicted as a long conflict between two dueling
theories, in kind of a legal approximation of the 100-year War. The first theory,
often taught to Americans as “our” theory, is Anglo-American, and describes the
purposes of copyright as utilitarian or “economic.” It premises the existence of
copyright on a market failure. Copyright exists to provide incentives for authors
to produce works, and avoid a sub-optimal creation of expressive works that
might otherwise result. It should accept limits on the right granted, if doing so
will encourage still greater creation of new works—justifying limitations like the
doctrine of fair use, and the idea-expression dichotomy. Copyright in this view
is ultimately about incentivizing creation, like other forms of economic
legislation: Lord Macaulay’s "tax on readers for the purpose of giving a bounty to
writers."11
The traditional nemesis of the Anglo-American view is depicted as the
European, or moral theory of copyright. It holds that authors have a natural
right to the fruits of their labors; copyright is granted because the author deserves
it. One version of this idea says that it is just that authors be rewarded for the
value they contribute to their society (which is different than putting up a reward
to encourage creation). Another, older version is as simple as the idea that as the
author owns his (smaller) creation in just the manner that God owns his (larger)
Creation. What you create is yours: “to every cow its calf.”12
On top of this traditional debate we find some modern complications.
The moral theory, in the United States at least, has mainly retreated to the status

11

T. Macaulay, Speeches On Copyright 25 (C. Gaston ed. 1914)
A. BIRRELL, SEVEN LECTURES ON THE LAW AND HISTORY OF
COPYRIGHT IN BOOKS 42 (1899).
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of foil, used more to accuse more than defend. 13 Several new clusters of
copyright theories now start with the American premise that copyright exists to
incentivize creative expression, but search for reasons apart from economic
market failure to believe that this might be important. The move is usually
Constitutional: the major examples are theories that see copyright’s incentive
structure as playing a role in a republican system of governance,14 or see
copyright’s incentive system as part of the larger system of free expression
associated by the First Amendment.15
This debate is familiar, interesting to copyright theorists, but also quite
misleading. It is misleading because it is not really a debate about copyright
theory, for what are advanced are not comprehensive theories of copyright.
Rather, the economic, moral and related approaches are theories of authorship,
and author-centric theories of copyright, for their concern is the effects the grant
of copyright on the individual creators of expressive works. This is not to say it
is wrong to consider copyright’s effects on authors; the mistake is to imagine that
this is a theory that accounts of copyrights’ effects on the industries it serves.
The goal of this Paper is to reintroduce a different kind of distinction:
between author-centric and communications theories of copyright, and to argue for
the primary of the latter. This Part reintroduces the view of copyright that puts
primacy on copyright’s communications policy, the regulating of conditions of
competition among publishers or disseminators, and the promotion of innovation
in dissemination technologies.
The Problem with Authorship Theories
13

Much recent writing on natural rights theories of copyright seeks not to defend it , but rather
to accuse Congress or the courts of wrongly reinstituting a natural rights regime through
expansion of copyright. See, e.g., See, e.g., James Boyle, Shamans, Software, and Spleens: Law
and the Construction of the Information Society 56-59 (1996); Mark Rose, Authors and
Owners: The Invention of Copyright (1993); Jaszi, supra note 9; Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory
of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "Authorship", 1991 Duke L. J. 455; Wendy J. Gordon,
A Property Right in Self- Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of
Intellectual Property, 102 Yale L.J. 1533, 1540 (1993) (arguing that courts have mistakenly
interpreted the natural law theory of copyright and afforded too much protection to authors at
the expense of free speech interests). See also Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law:
Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 Ohio St. L.J. 517, 529-39 (1990) (stressing that natural
law concepts are inherent in copyright law).
14
See, e.g., Neil Netanel, Copyright And A Democratic Civil Society, 106 Yale L.J. 283 (1996);
William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing The Fair Use Doctrine, 101 Harv.L.Rev. 1659 (1988).
15
See, e.g., Yohai Benkler, Free As The Air To Common Use: First Amendment Constraints
On Enclosure of The Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 354 (1999);
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An important reason for copyright theory to abandon author-centrism are
the accepted limits of the approach. Copyright researchers have long struggled
to understand what the actual effects of the copyright law on creative individuals
are. They therefore have great difficult showing that the current or some
imagined state of copyright law is impeding the optimal production of expressive
works. Even if we were perfectly able to understand copyright’s effects on
authors, there would still be reasons to consider other effects. But with
diminishing returns to our ability to optimize copyright with respect to individual
creativity, the case for considering other goals is stronger.
Sticking with the incentives theories that dominate U.S. copyright, most
theorists agree16 (1) that granting some exclusive rights in works of authorship
will encourage creation of expressive works, but (2) that the law must strike some
balance between the concerns of existing authors and new authors.17 The
general agreement on these positions, however, masks great difficulties in
answering very basic questions. Suppose we faced dueling proposals for
copyright reform. One, the “strong rights” view, would simplify copyright by
eliminating any limitation on the rights of copyright owners other than the rule
that ideas cannot copyrighted, and the existing fair use doctrine. 18 The “weak
rights” view would move in the opposite direction, returning copyright owners
back to the twin 14 year terms of the 1790 Act.19 How do we know which
would be closer to a socially optimal incentives for creating new works?
This question is uncomfortably hard to answer. The greatest
indeterminacy arises from the unknown degree to which copyright law, as
opposed to other barriers to entry or sources of utility motivate authors to create
expressive works. No one denies that money encourages writing. But since
Arnold Plant’s study of publishers in 1934, theorists have been pointing out the
multiplicity of means available for remuneration or market advantage.20 The
16

Not all. There is a persistent literature that rejects these assumptions and argues that
copyright does not inspire the creation of new works. See, e.g., Mark Nadel, Questioning the
Economic Justification for Copyright, (draft 2003),
http://www.serci.org/congress/papers/nadel.pdf.
17
Some take the relevant balance to be between owners of copyright and the public, see e.g.,
Pam Samuelson. This expresses a distributional concern that will be addressed presently.
18
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). The denial of protection to ideas, as opposed to their expression, is
usually taken, along with term limits, as the most basic concession to the public domain.
19
Such an approach is recommended in, for example [ James Boyle].
20
See Arnold Plant, The Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books, 1 ECONOMICA (n.s.)
167 (1934) (arguing that publishers have sufficient means other than copyright to obtain
remuneration and recommending a compulsory licensing scheme that takes effect five years
after publication); see also, Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of
Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 350
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relative size of copyright versus other sources of rewards remains unknown.
Some suspect, as Stephen Breyer did in 1970, that if copyright is just a means of
encouraging creation of new works, it might be a redundancy, or there might be
cheaper ways of achieving the same results.
Second, the relationship between the copyright law and the market for
expressive products is not well understood. At an extreme, we know that
putting a work in the public domain will affect the price that can be charged.
But for smaller doctrinal differences—like as between a copyright with a stronger
or weaker fair use doctrine, it is hard to tell whether the effect on the market
price will be significant, particularly as compared to competing effects on market
price. Even if there becomes some effect, the effect on authorial as opposed to
disseminator income is another step blurrier. Finally, the effect of small doctrinal
changes on what a potential author takes to be the projected future benefits of
creative work—the point at which the incentives to create actually matter—is by
this point shrouded in economic mystery.
A final and non-trivial complication arises from the question of whether
the social goals of copyright are simply quantitative (produce more works), or
whether copyright should concern itself with the nature or quality of the goods
produced. For example, Glenn Lunney, who is concerned with the effects of too
generous incentives to create, argues that more generous rights may steer authors
to produce popular, as opposed to great works.21 Yohai Benkler, meanwhile,
argues that strong rights systems promote certain modes of information
production, namely, “commercialization, concentration, and homogenization.”22
Some have taken excessive production of expressive works as a form of social
waste: Why support the work of Tom Clancy and Danielle Steele and John
Grisham when all write books that are entertaining and easy to read? Writers
like Michael Abramowicz believe that we live in a world of redundancy: that the
“consumer of copyright works buys in markets overflowing in variety, bordering
on redundancy … to intellectual property theorists … copyright must seem
successful indeed.”23
These kinds of questions have dogged efforts to assess whether the
weakness or strength of copyright laws are impeding creative expression. The
result is that different camps have constructed completely independent tragedies
(1970) (arguing that copyright may not be necessary to encourage creation of various types of
works).
21
See Glenn Lunney, The Death of Copyright, Digital Technology, 87 Va. L. Rev. 813 (2001).
22
Yohai Benkler, Intellectual Property And The Organization Of Information Production, 22
Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 81 (2002).
23
See Michael Abramowicz, Copyright Redundancy (draft on file with author, 2003).
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of authorship following from too much, or too little, copyright protection
respectively. This is possible because the method consists of internal critiques,
hunches, and frightening stories, as opposed to clear evidence of quantitative or
qualitative harm to the creative process.
Consider the current debate. The loudest arguments that mass
infringement threatens authorship comes from the recording industry. Their
argument is as follows: CD sales have fallen since the development of effective
evasion; hence there is less money to develop talent; hence, the incentive system
of copyright is threatened. While superficially possessed of infallible logic,
closer examination reveals serious flaws. First, the data itself has difficulty
independent analysts have found that the decline in CD sales is equally
consistent with explanations such as economic recession and competition from
other forms of entertainment. But even if CD sales have declined because of
copyright infringement, the harder question is whether CD sales—as just one
technology of dissemination—are in fact a good proxy for the incentives facing
creators of music. Sheet music sales declined in the age of the phonograph; yet
this was hardly the end of music in America. Put another way: recorded music
revenue is proportionally far larger now than it was in the 1950s - 1970s, yet
those eras are generally regarded as a golden age of creativity in popular music.
So while the argument has intuitive appeal, the evidence of harm to authorship,
as opposed to the dominant disseminator, is lacking.
The critics of copyright’s growth do not fare better. One approach is to
take the past as a baseline and base criticism on the fact of change itself. Terry
Fisher, for example, has illustrated the growth of copyright and other intellectual
property regimes in the 20th century, and suggested that things have gone too
far. But (as Fisher acknowledges), the difficulty with this argument is that the
markets for expressive works have changed so much it is hard to tell whether the
expansion of rights in the 20th century was warranted.
Another is the use of stories and anecdotes that portray a level of
protection would strike a reasonable person as excessive. For example, critics of
current copyright doctrine complain that singing “Happy Birthday” in front of a
crowd violates the right of public performance in a copyrighted work.24 Jessica
Litman argues that imagining a different actor in a movie you just saw is
technically the creation of a derivative work.25 Lawrence Lessig’s The Future of
Ideas opens with a filmmaker faced with the hassle of licensing every bit of
background work that appears in every scene. These examples may strike people
as a bit loony, or in the filmmaker story, upsetting. But while the anecdotes and
24
25

Jonathan Zittrain, Remarks at Catholic University Law School, Oct. 9, 2002.
Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright ___ (2000).
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hypotheticals may inspire the sense that copyright has gone to far, assessing
whether any of this has inhibited creation of new works remains difficult.
The Communications Approach
Casting copyright as a question of communications policy allows us to see the
same question differently, and arrive at different goals for the copyright law.
To think of copyright in communications policy terms requires beginning
with a basic model. A disseminator is anyone owns a legally protected means of
communication with a customer, as follows:
Fig. Communications Model
Disseminator

Legally
Protected
Link

Consumer

The legally protected link can be physical copper loops between the telephone
company and the consumer; the cable infrastructure, and so on. In such cases
we see the legal protection stemming primarily from the ownership of physical
infrastructure. But the link can also be a purely legal entitlement, like the
allocation of a certain spectrum to a broadcaster to reach his customers.
From here the policy questions now all concern the degree to which the legal
protection afforded that link should allow the original owner, or the incumbent
disseminator, from preventing a competing disseminator, a challenger, from
reaching the customer in question, using either new media, complementary
products, or otherwise. This is what is familiar to communications policy
theorists refer to as the “bottleneck problem.”26
Fig. The Bottleneck Problem
Incumbent

Legally
Protected
Link

Consumer

Challenger

26

See, e.g., Ingo Vogelsang and Bridger M. Mitchell, Telecommunications Competition 55
(2001) (on the effect of bottlenecks in communications policy).
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As phrased, the bottleneck problem ends up being central question to most
contemporary areas of communications policy: wireline regulation, broadband
regulation, and spectrum policy.27 (It is also a restatement of issues of barriers to
entry in antitrust policy, but in a specific context). In each case the basic tradeoff
is the same. On the one hand, allowing the incumbent too much power to
prevent challengers from reaching customers retards both price competition and
(according to the modern view) innovation in new communications technologies.
But granting to little legal protection to the original link create incentives to freeride and underinvest in building the original link and its technological successors.
With some simplifying assumptions, it is not hard to see the copyright law as
simply another means of protecting a link between an incumbent disseminator
and his customers. The principal difference is that the links that
communications law is accustomed to tend to be different types of media, rather
than different individual products. But that is a difference than does not change
the analysis.
Under this view, the publisher28 of a copyrighted book has a legally protected
link between himself and the consumers of that book, analogous to the local
exchange carrier’s ownership of the telephone lines. The question then becomes
the extent to which copyright should block challenger disseminators from
reaching that consumer with some kind of competitive product, either through
the contents of the book recast in different media, or a different product
altogether.
Fig. Copyright as Communications Bottleneck
Incumbent

Copyright

Consumer

Challenger

To make this example more realistic, consider a book publisher with a
copyright to a well known book, like Harry Potter and the Philosophers’ Stone.
The communications questions that arise are the degree to which challenger
disseminators reach consumers with two different types of competing products:
(1) versions of the original delivered via competing media, and (2) similar
27

See Ingo Vogelsang and Bridger M. Mitchell, Telecommunications Competition 51-59
(2001).
28
For present purposes we ignore the fact that copyright is vested in authors, rather than
disseminators, for reasons explained below.
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products. We see these questions raised by the following kinds of products

•
•
•
•
•

Movie adaptations
Television adaptations
Translations
Electronic versions of the Book delivered through the Internet
Other Child-Wizard books

Based on ideas of authorship that transcend media-types,29 copyright gives the
incumbent the right to block a challenger in most of these forms of challenger or
cross-media competition, but does not block competition in similar books. It is
also significant thatt today that electronic versions of the book are freely
downloadable in a mainly unenforced violation of the copyright law. We can
therefore see in today’s copyright law a choice of communications policy with
effects on challenger industries.
This basic idea—that the grant of copyrights will affect competition for
expressive products—is obviously not new. The insight here is understanding
the dynamic effects of the inhibition of competition on industry innovation.
Most particularly, viewing access to consumers as a competition between
incumbent and challenger disseminators will tend to put the incumbent in a
position to control the or strongly influence the development of new
dissemination technologies.
Against Granting Clear Entitlements Up Front
While copyright’s communications regime is generally under-theorized,
there are nonetheless some ideas on how copyright should function with respect
to cross-media competition. Property theorists often argue that best approach to
any potential dispute between incumbent and competitor is to grant as broad and
clear a copyright entitlement up front, applicable across a breadth of
dissemination media. This, it is argued, would force parties into private
negotiation and eliminate the possibility of destructive conflict.30 And this
approach is to a degree codified in the 1976 Copyright Act, which states that
copyright subsists in “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression, now known or later developed ….”31
29

17 U.S.C. §102(a)
See generally, Robert P. Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property
Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996).
31
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (italics added).
30
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In the communications field, Peter Huber is a well-known proponent of this
approach. As he along with John Thorne and Michael Kellog argue in their
treatise with respect to the mid-century conflict between cable and broadcast:
It is interesting to speculate how differently things might have developed if
the Supreme Court had affirmed both cable’s copyright obligations and its
First Amendment rights simply and clearly at the outset … Without a right
to pull signals from the air, cable might have started up more slowly, but it
would have probably grown more quickly.32
There are, I want to suggest, strong reasons to question this intuition: reasons
why it may not be optimal to create a scheme that puts the incumbent
disseminator in a position to enforce (or try to enforce) a clear, copyright
entitlement from the outset. There are two classes of argument. The first
largely mirror the arguments against the prospect theory in patent,33 or the
existence of the derivative works doctrine in copyright34—that they put too much
faith in a pioneer to steward the growth of the industry. The arguments for
clear and broad property entitlements to eliminate conflict may incidentally
embody a theory of innovation of questionable merit.
The second argument recognizes that the costs of enforcing certain rights
may make granting a broad initial entitlement irrelevant as a means of limiting
conflict. Home copying is an example: if enforcing limits on home copying is
unfeasibly expensive, conflict between the challenger and incumbent is
unavoidable, and the model of broad rights provides no answer.
First, the argument from innovation theory. For any form of expressive work
(video, book, music, etc.) there will exist several potential technologies of
dissemination. However, not every method of dissemination is invented at the
same time, and indeed many cannot be predicted ex ante. For example, the
pioneering system of mass television dissemination was terrestrial broadcast—
rabbit ear antennas and tall towers. In time various successive technologies of
mass video dissemination developed and reduced to practice, including wire
(cable television), satellite, and most recently, streaming applications on the
world wide web.
From this we can see that granting a copyright entitlement that covers all
forms of dissemination can have the effect of giving the pioneer industry the
32

See John Thorne et al., Federal Broadband Law §10.11 at 642 (1995).
See, e.g., Merges and Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 Colum. L.
Rev. 839, 890-94 (1990).
34
See Mark Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 Texas
Law Review 989 (1997)
33
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power to control follow-on development of technology for delivering video.
Assuming that the pioneer controls the creation of content (either by controlling
copyrights, vertical integration or simple economic dependence), it can dictate
what happens and what does not. In the example of broadcast, if copyright in
programming had clearly included future technologies like cable and satellite
transmission, the decision to allow these dissemination technologies to develop
would have rested with the broadcast industry.35
There are advantages of this approach. As suggested by Ed Kitch’s original
work on the prospect theory in patent law, control centralized in a pioneer
industry allows a more orderly process of deploying follow-on innovation.36 The
costs of conflict discussed above may be eliminated if broad, enforceable rights
are granted. The broadcasting industry could, for example, have directed the
orderly build-out of cable systems, avoiding some the endless fighting and
hostility that characterized the actual process.
But over the last two decades the argument against such centralized models
has strengthened. Economists led by writers like Richard Nelson and Sidney
Winter argue that innovation is best described as a trial-and-error, evolutionary
process.37 Markets select from a variety of competing approaches to
improvement whose relative merit is difficult to assess in advance. Believers in a
Darwinian process believe both that the most promising path of development is
difficult to predict in advance, and that any one party will suffer from cognitive
biases (such as a predisposition to continue with current ways doing business)
that make it unlikely to come to the right decisions, despite best intentions. If
innovation does indeed occur this way, legal theorists argue that a model that
vests control over improvement in a central authority may yield unfavorable
results.38
A critical assumption here is that the incumbent controls the copyrights that
the challenger would like to disseminate. As we will see, as a descriptive matter
this tends to be the case. The RIAA brings copyright lawsuits against Napster;39

35

Accord, Trotter Hardy, Copyright and "New-Use" Technologies, 23 Nova S.E.Univ. L. Rev.
657 (1999).
36
See Edmund Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 JLE 265 (1977).
37
See, e.g., John Ziman, evolutionary models for technological change, in Technological
Innovation as an Evolutionary Process 3 (John Ziman, ed., 2000); Richard Nelson,
Understanding Technical Change as an Evolutionary Process (1987).
38
E.g., Merges and Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 Colum. L. Rev.
839, 890-94 (1990); generally, Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas (2000).
39
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
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sheet music publishers who brought suit against the piano roll industry,40 and it
was broadcasters who sought to control cable in the 1960s.41
I don’t want to deny the possibility that, in theory, creators of content could
separate their interests from the incumbent disseminator and support the
development of a challenger. There are simply very few examples of this
happening.42 So long as incumbent disseminators continue to control important
copyrights, the grant of broad rights will raise serious questions of innovation
policy.
Second, the model of broad initial rights can only be an answer when such
rights can be enforced. Yet the recent history of copyright is full of scenarios
where rights exist without reasonable prospects of enforcement. For example,
as is discussed in the section following, all sides recognized that copyright was
unenforceable against casual home copying in the 1980s. While this point is
complicated by improved technologies of copy protection, so long as there exist
rights that would be extremely expensive to enforce, the model of broad initial
grants cannot be a complete answer.
None of this is to suggest that there is no use is trying to optimize
copyright’s authorship function. Instead, I am suggesting that portray every
perceived problem as a threat to authorship ultimately serves more of a rhetorical
than analytic function. The concept of copyright as an engine of free expression
and creativity is wonderfully attractive, and both sides exploit the drama of
authorship imperiled. Yet I suggest that we find clearer direction by looking to
today’s problems as a failure in copyright’s relatively unattractive role in
communication regulation, where, I suggest, we may see clearly that the law has
fallen into dysfunction.
Regime
PART II – Copyright’s De Facto Communications Reg
ime
The first Part of this article has been largely normative: it is the argument
that an author-centric view of copyright is of limited utility and has the
incidental effect of creating poor communications policy. Part II makes a
descriptive claim: that much of the copyright law and its institutional structure
are in fact an under-theorized communications regime.
The Modular View of Copyright
40
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A casual reader of the copyright code itself would quickly realize that
much in the statute is difficult to explain as a property rights scheme designed to
encourage creation of new works. That description may fit certain core sections,
like the statement of subject matter in §102, and the exclusive rights expressed in
§106, and general exceptions, like the fair use doctrine, in §107. These are the
mainstay of the copyright law, and attract by far the most academic attention.43
But large sections of the code seem to have little to do with this model.
They are, rather, devoted to industry-specific liability rules (compulsory licensing
schemes) and immunities. These sections are ugly, complicated, and obscure to
copyright students.44 They include the mechanical license in section §115, the
secondary transmission license (for cable television) in §111, and particular
immunities for particular groups, such as internet service providers in §512 and
digital audio recording devices in §1001 et seq. Largely concerned with the
interests of disseminators, their relationship to a putative author’s incentives to
create would seem, at best, indirect.
How do we account for these sections? I argue that they are evidence of
copyright’s divided functionality: the fact that the law is managing distinct
relationships, under different theories, using different institutions. Consider the
world of packaged information as comprised primarily of three groups: authors,
disseminators, and consumers of expressive works.
Fig.
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The modular description of copyright suggests that the law is focused on
the management of two distinct relationships: between new and existing
authors, and between incumbent and challenger industries of dissemination.
The former is copyright as a authorship regime; the later is copyright as a
communications regime. 45
The De Facto Communications Regime
Copyright’s de facto communications regime manages relationships
between rival disseminators: like cable systems and broadcasters, or CD
publishers and Internet service providers. In the doctrine this role is reflected in
the following sections. One cluster reflects concessions or immunities that limit
the scope of the right in a manner that is expressed as a public limit, yet which
benefits a particularlized private group:
§ 112 – Ephemeral recordings
§ 117 – Computer programs and RAM copies
§ 118 – Public broadcasting license
§ 121 – Reproductions of nondramatic works for those with disabilities
§ 906 – Reverse engineering of mask works permitted
§ 907 – Immunity for innocent infringers of mask works
§ 1201 – “Backup” provisions of DMCA copy control circumvention
Another set of immunities fall within a second class, reflecting a balance
between competing private interests.
§ 111 – Secondary transmissions by cable operators
§ 114 – Digital Audio Transmission / Webcasting license
§ 115 – Musical works recording license
§ 116 – Jukebox negotiated licenses
§ 119 – Satellite retransmissions of television signals
§ 122 – Satellite retransmissions of television signals into local markets
§ 512 – Immunity for ISPs transmitting or hosting infringing
material
§ 1008 – Immunity for producers of digital audio recording devices

45

I don’t mean to suggest that these two functions are the only possible major functions of
copyright. For example, there appears to be much in the code that cannot be explained other
than as a system for protecting the reputation of existing works, in a manner similar to
trademark. Examples include some of the latest term extensions and arguably the derivative
works doctrine. There is also evidence to suggest parts of copyright are optimized to play an
evidentiary role, see, e.g., Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence (working paper
2002).
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What characterizes these parts of the copyright statute as a de facto
communications regime is the fact they speak principally to rival disseminators.
They are, more precisely, the results of a settlement process that has attempted to
mediate the interests between incumbent and challenger industries.
The Process and Institutions of Copyright Settlement
So how, precisely, does copyright’s communications regime operate?
This part claims that the primary mode has been the process of copyright
settlement. That is to say, the various statutory schema are the consequence of
complex negotiated settlements between rival industries that are codified directly
in the copyright statute.
Part III offers a more detailed history of copyright settlement in 20th century
history. Here, however, we can describe the copyright settlement model in more
general terms.
As in the basic communications model developed above, there are two
relevant actors. In one figurative corner is an incumbent disseminator, already
earning a supra-competitive profit, thanks its control of expressive works that
enjoy exclusive rights created by copyright. This is the sheet music publishing
industry before the piano-roll and gramophone; the broadcasting industry before
cable, and so on. In this situation, the primary concern of the incumbent is what
public choice theorists like call “rent-protecting”; that, is, dedicating resources to
protecting its favorable position from encroachment from other groups.46 The
incumbent holds a number of potential legal threats against any challenger,
including the imposition of incessant litigation costs, an ability to convince
regulators (like the Federal Communications Commission) to restrict the
challenger, or to lobby for laws that will put the challenger at a serious
disadvantage. The incumbent, increasingly, may also to employ technological
self-help measures that deny access to the content it controls in the first place.
On the other side are the challengers: the new disseminators, be they the
nascent cable industry, piano roll companies, or internet services. The
challengers are challengers for two relevant reasons. First, they enjoy some
technological advantage in the delivery of content – either better quality (like
cable or piano rolls), or lower cost (like broadcasting or peer filesharing). To
simplify things, we can simply model this as a lower marginal cost of
dissemination. In the history of conflict, the second typical advantage enjoyed
by challengers is their unregulated status, as compared with the incumbent.
46

For an explication of rent-protecting in the context of public choice theory, see Robert E.
Tollison, Rent Seeking, in Perspectives on Public Choice 506, 515-517 (Dennis Mueller, ed.,
1997).
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They may be unregulated either because existing copyright or communications
law was not written to apply to them (as in the cases of cable or gramophones, or
internet service providers), or because of some capability to evade the law (as in
third generation peer filesharing and unregulated satellites).
Given this scenario, a simple way the challenger can compete is through
acting in the interests of consumers, providing transmission of copyrighted
content at a steep discount. Stated less charitably, challengers free-ride and pass
on some of the savings. The discount is at some price above its marginal costs of
transmission, but below the market price set by the content owners. The new
dissemination technologist is restoring to consumers part of the consumer surplus
taken by the copyright law, consisting of both the monopoly rents and
deadweight loses.
A conflict arises because the incumbent resists the wealth transfer, while the
challenger fights to gain it. Viewed in basic rent-seeking terms, each side will be
willing to spend considerable amounts of money protecting or seeking to transfer
the surplus created by the copyright law.47
Fig. The Gains from Piracy
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What precisely are these expenditures? As we will see, they can manifest in
several ways: incessant litigation between the parties, lobbying for laws to
disadvantage the other, and (increasingly) investments in self-help measures,
such as technologies of protection, and technologies of evasion.
From the histories that follow, we can describe the pattern more precisely.
In an early period, the incumbent industry may not recognize the challenger as a
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challenger. For example, cable broadcasting was regarded principally a
complement to broadcast for the first decade of its existence, as a kind of signal
boosting technology.
Once the incumbent recognizes the threat, its first move is convince the
judiciary or a regulatory agency to recognize and prevent the theft. The
incumbent sues for copyright infringement, common law unfair competition, or
convinces a regulator that the public interest is threatened. This gives the court
a distributive choice between the new disseminator and the existing owners.
Historically, the court has taken the side of new technologies of disseminators,
generally for doctrinal reasons, though perhaps thanks to an underlying interest
in maximizing consumer welfare. Yet that initial decision is not the final say. It
is simply a prelude to a negotiated settlement that is implemented in copyright
legislation.
In general, the legislative settlement splits the surplus between the content
owner and the new technologist. It has two advantages. First, it brings an end
to the waste incurred struggling over the distribution of the copyright surplus.48
In effect, the challenger is paying off the incumbent to avoid the incumbent’s
most serious threats.
Second, and perhaps most importantly, it prevents the repression of a new
technological innovation. As long as there is some reduction of in price thanks
to the new technology of dissemination, consumers should benefit as well, albeit
less than if it were not necessary to pay off the existing owner. So, in theory at
least, copyright’s settlement role in areas of new technology should be capable of
producing results that, if not optimal, may at least be socially beneficial.
Is Copyright’s Settlement Function Defensible?
I have suggested (1) that copyright comprises independent authorship and
communications regimes, and (2) the communications regime functions through
specific settlement of disputes among rival disseminators. The question is, does
this settlement role serve the public interest?
In general, academics, whether pro- or anti- copyright, have been highly
critical of both the process and results of copyright’s settlement function. First,
those who resist the growth of copyright criticize as too fact-specific,
complicated, inflexible, and charge that they unfairly disadvantage parties absent
to the negotiation (namely, consumers). For example, Jessica Litman, a leading
critic, argues that “negotiations among current stakeholders tend to produce laws
that resolve inter-industry disputes with detailed and specific statutory language
48
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which rapidly grows obsolete.” 49 As for absent interests, she charges that “[e]ach
time we rely on current stakeholders to agree to a statutory scheme, they produce
a scheme designed to protect themselves against the rest of us.”50 Litman, in
general, advocates simpler, and more general copyright laws: “a law that balances
elastic rights with comparatively elastic, flexible limitations.”51
Property-side critics like Bob Merges and Peter Huber also berate
statutory settlements—in particular, compulsory licensing regimes—but for
different reasons. They generally regard such settlements as a poor substitutes
for privately negotiated solutions. These authors favor a clear allocation of
property entitlements up front that might promote the resolution of disputes
through more flexible price-fixing agreements brokered through private collective
rights regimes, such as ASCAP.52
Can copyright’s settlement function for disseminators nonetheless be
defended? The critics have a point. Copyright settlements not for the
aesthetic: they comprise by far the least readable sections of the copyright code.
As solutions to a conflict of a certain time and place, they are frequently outdated
by economic and technological change. And they do not always succeed in
eliminating continuing conflicts between the relevant parties.
Nonetheless I would suggest that copyright settlement function can be
defended. First and foremost are the reasons discussed in Part I: the arguments
from innovation theory.53 The main point is that if the alternative is granting
clear entitlements up front, the cure is not worth the disease. To repeat, the
problem with a grant of rights that reliably extends to all new technologies is that
it puts the incumbent in the position of managing future innovation. And
while there remains some reason to believe that a monopolist is good for
technological innovation, the dominant view among innovation and competition
theorists is that the opposite is true.
But there is another defense of copyright settlement worth elaborating: as
an alternative device to contractual settlement. The assumption is that there will
exist at least two classes of conflict between disseminators: some in which
parties will reach agreements of mutual benefit; and others where, absent some
49
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state action, parties will create tremendous social waste in their efforts to destroy
one another.54 In this respect copyright is justified by lending aid in instances
where it bargaining does not succeed independently.
The degree to which this is an important role depends on whether we
believe that such conflicts exist. If groups can be assumed to inevitably reach
bargains of the greatest possible mutual advantage, copyright’s dispute resolution
function would be unnecessary.55 But if we expect that at least some conflicts in
the copyright world will result in bargaining failures with social consequences, a
dispute resolution role is justified.
These points are important for dealing the criticisms of settlements cast in
copyright, as opposed to contract. As discussed above, the substance of the deals
struck can easily be criticized as sub-optimal. For example, the fees embedded
in compulsory licensing schemes can be ludicrously slow to adapt to modern
conditions.56 The point of the dispute resolution argument is that this
inefficiency must be weighed against the social value of ending conflict, or
removing the most destructive options from the option set of competing
entities.57
IIII:
Part II

Copyright’s Communications Policy in the Twentieth Century

I have suggested in this paper that copyright’s communication policy has
generally been implemented through statutory settlements between rival
communications industries. In the part that follows I outline what has given
rise to such disputes in the first place, and how copyright’s communications
module has tried to resolve them.
The Birth of the Recording Industry
The birth of the recording industry in the late 1890s and early 1900s marked
the century’s first use of copyright to settle a major conflict. The recording
industry, predating today’s online distribution, cable and others, was the original
technological free-rider: the first to build a business whose success depended, in
part, on copyright arbitrage.
The pioneers of the recording industry were the manufacturers of piano rolls
and the manufacturers of “talking machines,” or early record players. Early
versions of these technologies were introduced in the late 1890s. By 1902, at
least a million piano rolls, each a representing copyrighted song, were in
54
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distribution.58 The record industry grew even faster: by 1899, 2.8 million
records had been sold.59 These mechanical reproductions were produced without
paying any licensing fees to the owners of the respective copyrights.
Technologically, the player piano and the record player were the “receiver” for
a new form of mass media—the paper piano roll or record, respectively. A
single purchase of copyrighted sheet music could be transformed by the recording
industry into rolls and records that reached tens of thousands of listeners. But
the success of mechanical recordings as a mass media sparked a conflict between
the incumbent industry: publishers of sheet music.
The Rhetoric
The rhetoric of the conflict is both independently fascinating and a template for
what has followed. The incumbent owners of copyrights adopted a theme
familiar to present ears: they depicted the recording industry as irresponsible
pirates whose reckless copying of music threatened American creativity. What
was in retrospect a battle over the impact of new technology was nonetheless
portrayed as a tragedy of authorship. As composer John Phillip Sousa informed
Congress:
These talking machines are going to ruin the artistic development of
music in this country. When I was a boy … in front of every house in the
summer evenings you would find young people together singing the songs
of the day or old songs. Today you hear these infernal machines going
night and day … The vocal chord will be eliminated by a process of
evolution, as was the tail of man when he came from the ape.60
Or as model lobbying letter from the composer’s perspective, dating from
1907 put it as follows:
What do I see? I see my compositions … stolen bodily by the phonographic
trust and piano-player combination, and ground out daily from thousands of
cylinders, disks, and rolls, without paying me or anyone of us one solitary
penny…61
A 1908 letter from the American Federation of Musicians, in another vein,
accuses the recording industry of free-riding on successful songs:
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We musicians feel that an injustice is perpetrated upon American composers
who, after popularizing their works, must stand by defenseless and see others
reap the benefits. In our observations we find that phonograph companies,
talking machines, etc. do not popularize works or compositions, but on the
contrary do only seize upon and utilize such as have already become
popular…62
How about the challengers? Sounding themes also familiar today, the recording
industry identified itself as the inventing class, heroes of American ingenuity and
engineering. They portrayed the incumbent industry as a monopoly threat
interested only in destroying a technologically advanced rival. The testimony of
an industry representative is representative:
[M]echanical players are distinctly the product of American inventive
genius and of American factories and should not be despoiled for the sake
of a small group of publishers, the largest percentage of which are
foreigners.
Self-described inventor Howlett Davis (who came to Congress to testify without
particular invitation) explained to Congress that composing new works was
simply not as important to the United States as invention of new technologies:
In all arts the work of the inventor will be found at the foundation of the
progress and prosperity of the country. …
So far as the mass of the people of this country is concerned, the work of
the composer is infinitesimal as compared to the work of the inventor.
Another theme stressed by the early recording industry was that the demand for
copyright expansion to records had nothing to do with composers themselves,
but merely the interests of intermediaries in achieving monopoly profits. In
particular, the recording industry argued that the sheet music publishers were
planning to ally themselves with one single manufacturer (the Aeolian company)
who would then monopolize the entire recording industry.
A inflammatory 1908 editorial in the newssheet “Musical Age” stated this case:
Now, who raises this hue and cry and creates this clamorous demand for
new and drastic [copyright] legislation? Is it the author? [No] … It is
the speculator and gambler. … In this country we find it is the Aeolian
company which assumes the role of “chief speculator.”
Similarly:
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It is not right … to destroy [the recording industry] for the benefit of a
half dozen alleged composers allied with a life-long and absolutely
exclusive monopoly [the Aeolian company]. The composer gets on the
sheet music all that he is entitled to get.63
A final argument, again recurrent in present times, was that the recording
industry was actually helping composers by spurring the sales of sheet music;
hence no change to copyright was needed. As stated by a representative of the
talking machine lobby:
It is impossible that there should be any sales of records of the composition
without there being a corresponding sale of sheet music. Each may help each
other, but phonographic reproduction is certainly a powerful stimulus to the
sale of sheet music.64
This argument—that the new technology of dissemination will ultimately aid
composers even without copyright—is a persistent theme.
Copyright Settlement
We are now in a position to understand the legal course of events that led to
settlement. The incumbents, unsurprisingly, took the lead. Early on,
publishers asked lower courts to find piano rolls (in 1888) and records (1901) an
infringement of copyright rights. These efforts failed.65
The incumbents, making the piracy arguments above, then moved to
Congress, achieving through a publisher’s conference a draft copyright bill that
would have granted composers full rights in mechanical recordings.66 At the
same time, in 1906 a new effort was made to obtain an appellate decision finding
mechanical recordings to be infringing copies: the test lawsuit was litigated all
the way to the Supreme Court. This was the now famous “piano-roll” case
White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.67
Unfortunately for the incumbents, the Supreme Court was unwilling to
extend copyright in the manner requested. It ruled, as the earlier courts had, that
a “copy” in the statute was a “reproduction or duplication of the original,” which
the perforated paper roll was evidently not. In hindsight it is clear that the
decision could have gone either way. The Court repeatedly relied on the fact
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that piano rolls were not visually similar to sheet music—a curious means to
adjudge the meaning a “copy” of an aural work.68
Many have criticized the purported formalism of the White-Smith Court.69
But at heart the decision embodies strong view of innovation policy. The court
sought to find in copyright a difference between a given work and its means of
expression:
The statute has not provided for the protection of the intellectual conception
apart from the thing produced, however meritorious such conception may be,
but has provided for the making and filing of a tangible thing, against the
publication and duplication of which it is the purpose of the statute to protect
....
In other words, White-Smith (and later cases) suggest that the pioneer
disseminator will be granted control over copyrighted works in her medium, but
not any future, competing means of dissemination. This principle has not been
universally followed, but is nonetheless a central theme of much copyright
dissemination caselaw of the century, as we will see.
The decision also has institutional, as opposed to doctrinal, significance. The
Court recognized that as between dissemination rivals it is in a poor position to
pick winners. It announced, instead, that it would the role of the Court to
choose the course most likely to lead to a Congressional settlement. The Court
stressed this aspect of White-Smith and other cases 76 years later, in the Sony
betamax decision:
Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference to
Congress when major technological innovations alter the market for
copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional authority and
institutional capability to accommodate fully the varied permutations of
competing interests that are inevitably implicated by such new
technology.70
In practice, a policy deference to Congress has meant deference to a process of
negotiated settlement between the parties to the conflict.
***
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Following White-Smith, publishers and the mechanical machine
manufacturers moved quickly to settle in a Congressional setting. Why
settlement? We can see that at this point, both challengers and incumbents
represented a serious threat to one another. Following White-Smith, composers
and publishers risked an ongoing decay of their profitability with no ability to
extract income from the recording industry. Conversely, the recording industry
risked the fact that publishers would succeed in their effort to extend copyright to
mechanical recordings and use this power to control their business. Principally,
they feared that expansion of copyright would be used by publishers to create a
monopolistic champion of their interests who would use copyright to destroy its
mechanical music rivals.71
Under these conditions, the two parties settled on a statutory “royalty”
scheme that was the first compulsory license system. The settlement extended to
a fixed, universal rate: 2 cents per song, per copy. These settlement was
primarily achieved in sessions in 1908, and was codified as section 1(g) of the
1909 copyright act.72
The nature of the settlement was as follows. One the one hand, Congress
created extended the copyright in compositions to mechanical recordings. But
in exchange, the recording industry received statutorily guaranteed access to all
copyrighted compositions, in exchange for a fee. Anyone willing to pay the
statutory fee was entitled to use any copyrighted composition to record his own
version of the song.
***
This mechanical license scheme survives to the present day. Among
academics, it is occasionally defended for its reduction in transaction costs,73 but
more typically berated for its inflexibility and insensitivity to changing economic
conditions.74 But both arguments may miss the point. Adjudged as a settlement
to the dispute among relevant actors, the mechanical license does better. It
resolved the dispute between sheet-music producers and the nascent recording
industry in a manner considered mutually beneficial. This doesn’t mean that the
mechanical license, in its terms, remains an optimal solution under present
conditions. But the willingness of the concerned parties to live with their deal
must be a part of any assessment.
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Important in this assessment is that neither party has made a serious effort to
repeal the mechanical license system.75 Representatives of composers did not
argue for its repeal in the 1976 Copyright Act,76 and today it is even defended by
representatives of the composer and music industry.77 The only change has been
an effort to make the license fee capable adjustable.
Cable Television & the Broadcasting Industry
A second major example of what I have described as copyright’s
settlement function is the bitter mid-century conflict between broadcasters and
the upstart cable industry. Reduced to its essentials, beginning the late 1950s
the broadcast industry and its affiliates mounted a large successful effort to
contain the growth of cable using every regulatory device at their disposal, while
the cable industry strove to take advantage of its unregulated status to erode the
dominant position of broadcast.
A general (albeit uneasy) settlement to the succession conflict was
achieved by the late 1970s, through a compromise on copyright legislation and
rescinding on the most onerous of FCC’s regulations and pseudo-copyrights.
With this settlement, cable began a more gracefully accession as the successor in
television dissemination.
The Challenge
Cable was not, at first, a challenger to the broadcast industry. The first
cable systems, then known as “community antenna” television (CATV),
developed in rural areas in the late 1940s. The goal of the early deployments
was modest: solving the problem of bringing broadcast television remote or
mountainous areas otherwise left in the dark. In the late 1940s, early cable
operators in places like Astoria, Orgeon (the site of the first recognized CATV
deployment) erected large, community antennas to bring distant signals to small
towns. The broadcast signal captured by the community antenna was
retransmitted to people’s homes using physical cables.
In this early manifestation cable was simply a complement to broadcast
service.78 By allowing the broadcast signal to reach areas not served by broadcast,
it expanded the television audience to the advantage of broadcast stations. This
75
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had changed, however, by the late 1950s, when broadcasters realized cable’s
threat as a successor industry.
Broadcasters had reason to fear. Cable technology had two clear
advantages over broadcasters that are now obvious: programming diversity79
(more channels) and signal quality. In face of this competitive threat, the
broadcast industry adopted the familiar arguments of piracy, unfair competition,
and economic disruption favored by incumbent industries. It adopted, in other
words, the arguments of sheet music manufacturers in the piano-roll era, and
record companies today. Along with these claims of unfair competition, the
broadcast industry added appeals to “localism”, the national policy of subsidizing
the existence of local broadcasting stations in every community.
The unfair competition or piracy claim was simply a claim that that cable
operators, because they did not pay for the content they retransmitted, were a
form of pirate, competing unfairly. Rhetorically, the broadcast industry openly
and repeatedly accused cable operators of “signal piracy.” As the copyright office
summarized their argument in 1965:
[Cable operators] neither need or deserve a free ride at the expense of
copyright owners … The activities of the CATV operators constitute a
“clear moral wrong” comparable to the old practice of “bicycling” movies
from one theatre to another in order to get two performances out of a
single license.80
…
As a local broadcaster testified in 1958:
We believe that when a community antenna system takes our programs
out of the air, without our permission, and sells that program material at a
profit—and in many cases, a fantastic profit, indeed—this is a violation of
our property rights.81
Jack Valenti of the Motion Picture Association made similar arguments
on the eve of settlement, June 1975, in testimony before congress:
79
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If Congress exempts television—cable television—from copyright … [it]
will not only be magnifying and sanctifying a terrible injustice, but it will
have created a huge parasite in the marketplace, feeding and fattening
itself off of local television stations and copyright owners of copyrighted
material. We do not like it because we think it wrong and unfair.82
Broadcasters associated themselves with the creation of programming
content, and cable with the destruction of incentives for creation. The
incumbents argued that the creation of programming rested on a delicate balance
of incentives: Broadcasters paid for the creation of the programming content,
and received local advertising revenue in return, serving the public interest in the
creation of new works. Cable operators, on the other hand, contributed nothing
to the creation of new works and therefore competed unfairly.83
But if cable simply carried broadcast signals, how did it endanger
broadcasting or the creation of new works? The broadcaster’s arguments relied
on the concept of audience fragmentation. They argued that the cable
operator’s practice of importing signals from “foreign” markets (i.e., from
Memphis to St. Louis) would fragment the viewing audiences between local
stations and the foreign imports. This would destroy advertising revenue,
because St. Louis advertisers, faced with an audience fragmented between
stations of both cities, would pay less, while local advertisers in Memphis
advertisers could care less about reaching buyers in St. Louis audiences, meaning
a net loss. This, broadcasters argued, would destroy the economic viability of
free television.
Concerns for “localism” amplified the fragmentation argument.84 The
FCC in 1952 declared localism a goal of national broadcasting policy: broadcast
should “provide each community with at least one television broadcast station.”85
The idea was that the public interest was served by local broadcast stations that
could provide content of matters of local importance, and not just the
programming of the big three networks.86 Cable operators, by importing
signals, were a particular threat to the viability of local broadcasters in small
markets.
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Finally, even if cable did offer a desirable diversity in programming,
broadcasters argued that the goal of diversity was better achieved through more
broadcast stations in every community, not the import and export of signals
around the country. In particular, broadcasters promoted developing new ultra
high frequency (UHF) stations as the preferred means for achieving
programming diversity.87
In retrospect, the weakness of these arguments are apparent. Cable was
indeed a threat to broadcasting as a better means of disseminating television.
Yet it did not follow that cable was also a threat to programming, because it too
ultimately came to have interest in the availability of new works. In particular,
cable, as most now recognize, was the savior of UHF broadcasting, because cable
improved the weak signal strength of UHF stations. The key, in retrospect,
would be to make cable a stakeholder—part of the compensation system for
newly created works—without giving broadcast a tool to destroy its rival. This,
ultimately, was the role that the copyright liability scheme was to play.
Controlling the Challenger
Faced with the competitive threat of cable and armed with these
arguments, the broadcast industry and its allies88 in the 1960s exploited all
available regulatory means to slow the growth of cable.
The industry attempted three separate avenues: common-law misappropriation
arguments, copyright infringement, and a kind of “pseudo-copyright” through
FCC regulation.
The broadcasting industry turned first to the common law in an effort to
gain a property rights in its broadcast signals. Beginning in the late 1950s, the
broadcasters asked the courts to find the behavior of cable companies a violation
of common-law misappropriation under International News Service v. Associated
Press, and other common-law theories.89 The argument in these lawsuits was
simple: cable operators are stealing our product (the signal) without providing
compensation, and are therefore competing unfairly and should be stopped. In
Associated Press, this basic theory had persuaded the Supreme Court to prevent
one wire service from stealing news from another, creating a pseudo-property
87
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interest in “hot news.” The right would have served the broadcasting’s interests
perfectly.
But these efforts failed. In closely watched litigation, the Ninth Circuit
held that the broadcasters’ remedy, if any, must lie in copyright.90 Pointing out
that the broadcasters sought “what are in essence copyright interests,” the court
found that the state grounds for protecting broadcasters rights federally
preempted. Technically, this decision came under the authority of then recently
decided copyright preemption cases Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.91 , and
Compco Corporation v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.92 But what is interesting as a
policy matter is the court’s recognition that the common law right threatened the
“primary right of public access to all in the public domain…”93 It reasoned that
the creation of a “new protectible interest that would interfere with the federal
policy of allowing free access to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright
laws leave in the public domain.”94
On the other hand, the Federal Communications Commission was
seemingly immune to such concerns. Bit-by-bit, it created a regime of pseudoproperty rights and other rules that, for a time, allowed the broadcast industry to
control the development of the cable industry.
While initially hesitant,95 the FCC began asserting jurisdiction in 1962; by
1965 “Second Report and Order,” the FCC had come agree with the
broadcaster’s substantive arguments and assume harm from cable’s existence. By
1966, broadcasters had persuaded the FCC to enact a full regime cable regulation
can be seen as a duplicate for the control broadcasters would have asserted with
property rights. The FCC rules barred duplication of local broadcasting (nonduplication rules), forced cable systems to carry local signals (must-carry rules),
and barred cable operators from importing signals into any of the top 100
television markets unless it could demonstrate that such a important would not
harm local broadcast stations. In short, the FCC rules put cable where
broadcast wanted it: as a complement, rather than a competitor, to the
broadcasting industry.
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Broadcaster’s third offensive came through copyight litigation, but here
broadcasters failed to achieve copyright control. In 1968, the inevitable question
of cable’s copyright liability reached the Supreme Court in Fortnightly Corp. v.
United Artists.96 The case was factually simple: a West Virginia cable operator
had retransmitted to its customers various broadcasted programs, and the
copyright holders claimed this to be an unauthorized performance under the
Copyright Act.
The Court disagreed, ruling (5-1) that cable television was the functional
equivalent of a more powerful antenna, and no more of an performer than an
antenna manufactuer would be. Policy considerations were left to the dissent.
Justice Fortas presented the problem as follows:
On the one hand, it is darkly predicted that the imposition of full liability
upon all CATV operations could result in the demise of this new,
important instrument of mass communications … On the other hand, it is
foreseen that a decision to the effect that CATV systems never infringe
the copyrights of the programs they carry would permit such systems to
overpower local broadcasting stations ….97
He suggested the court should act to “do as little damage as possible to
traditional copyright principles and to business relationships, until Congress
legislates and relieves the embarrassment which we and the interested parties
face.”
The seeds of a future copyright settlement are evident from the
Fortnightly litigation. Solicitor General Erwin Grisgold suggested in his amicus
brief on the merits that the Supreme Court could reasonably impose a copyright
settlement in its decision.98 He asked the court to find performance liability on
the one hand, but an implied license where broadcast signals were weaker.
While both majority and dissent declined the invitation to settle the dispute in
this manner, it foretold a copyright settlement in the horizon.
In the meantime, copyright settlement was not yet forthcoming. In the
aftermath of Fortnightly, broadcasters succeeded in convincing the FCC to grant
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rights even more similar to copyright to broadcasters, as if in compensation for
their loss. 1968 saw the introduction of the right of “retransmission consent.”99
As the name suggests, under this rule, cable operators were required to obtain the
consent of the relevant broadcaster before importing any program into a top 100
market.
In retrospect, the experiment with a retransmission consent rule was
something of a dry run for a full copyright regime. The results were not
promising. A 1979 study found that during the period of 1968-1972,
broadcasters granted virtually no consent for retransmission.100 While it may be
that the regime was not given enough time to work, the more likely explanation
is that broadcast was interested in starving its rival.101 It hints at some of the
dangers of copyright as between rival disseminators, particular in early stages.
Settlement & Copyright
In 1970, it appeared that the cable’s full potential as a mass media had
been walled-off. A law review article appearing that year declared that
“[a]lthough cable television offers the potential of greatly increased television
diversity, its possibilities have been left largely unrealized.”102 While cable had
grown to reach about 6% of households, with approximately 4.5 million
subscribers103 its challenge to broadcast was halted at the urban border. As
economic historians Stanley Besen and Robert Crandall explained matters:
Cable entered the 1970s as a small business relegated primarily to rural
areas and small communities and held hostage by television broadcasters
to the Commission’s hope for the development of UHF.104
By the end of the decade, however, cable had been released from its
figurative prison. Through a decade-long process of compromise, negotiation,
FCC rulemaking and Congressional legislation, a truce of sorts was reached:
Most of the FCC’s pseudo-property rights and other restrictions were
abandoned,105 in exchange for a system centered on a copyright liability regime.106
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While by no means an aesthetic exercise, the history of that time shows the role
the copyright regime played in perhaps the most bitter succession war of the
century.
In 1970, broadcasters had successfully convinced the FCC impose serious
limits on the growth of cable; akin, perhaps, to the early success of the recording
industry in stopping the filesharing industry. So why would broadcasters even
want to turn to a copyright compromise, if it might jeopardize a favorable status
quo? We can see several possible explanations.
Primarily, a copyright solution promised to be more durable. The
restrictive regime created by the FCC was in a state of constant fluctuation, and
was easier to change than copyright legislation would be. New commissioners at
the FCC could (and ultimately did) agree with the positions of cable television,
jeopardizing broadcasting’s favorable position. In particular, mounting evidence
suggested that the danger of cable systems to television (as opposed to
broadcasters) was exaggerated.107 This suggests that broadcasters may have felt
pressure to convert what regulatory advantage they had currency into a more
lasting source of revenue.
For broadcasters, this problem was compounded by the growing power of
the cable industry relative to themselves. Despite the limitations on urban
growth, cable continued to grow in rural and small markets, trebling in size
between 1966 and 1970.108 The growing power of the cable industry suggested
that broadcaster’s ability to influence the regulatory and legislative process might
erode over time, making a more durable compromise more attractive.
Finally, in the late 1960s, many broadcasters began investing in cable
systems. By 1966, broadcasters had some stake in 30 percent of cable
companies.109 With interests on both sides, broadcasters were interested in a
solution that would allow cable to grow in exchange for payoffs to the
broadcasting industry, a purpose bettered served by a copyright royalty system
than FCC regulations.
The original embodiment of the settlement was the “Compromise
Agreement of 1971,” representing an agreement between major cable,
broadcasting, and programming interests. The basic elements of the
compromise were this: Cable, for the first time, agreed to some system of
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copyright liability, in exchange for a general loosening of FCC restrictions on
entry into urban markets, and other concessions to public service.110 While the
consensus did not last, in the end, the agreement was the starting point for a
near-total deregulation of cable systems in exchange for the copyright system.
The compromise, brokered by new FCC chairman Dean Baruch, began
to be implemented on the regulatory side with new FCC rules that allowed cable
systems limited importation rights in the top 100 markets. 111 The 1972 rules,
described as “among the most complex rules and regulations ever devised by the
mind of man” began a gradual process of FC deregulation of the cable industry.112
The copyright side of the deal took a further 4 years to settle through the
legislative process. While the major industry associations remained committed
to the agreement, problematically, many members of the cable industry sought to
defect. For example, representatives of Teleprompter Corp., one of the nation’s
largest cable systems, appeared before Congress to demand continued immunity
from copyright, claiming that the consensus agreement was “pushed down the
throat of the cable television industry, in my opinion, by the White House.”113
They and other cable operators returned to the position that cable systems were
nothing but another form of antenna – “why should there be any liability when
the viewer avails himself of the antenna tower erected by the cable television
station?”114
On the other side, broadcasters made a final effort to obtain full copyright
liability with the Teleprompter litigation.115 In Teleprompter, unlike Fortnightly,
was an signal importation case. Columbia Broadcast Systems could point to
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Teleprompters imports, some from as far as 450 miles116 – and make the audience
fragmentation argument described above. The result was nonetheless the same.
The Supreme Court affirmed its simple holding: “’Broadcasters perform.
Viewers [including cable] do not perform.’117”
These last-ditch efforts not-withstanding, Congress finally enacted the
copyright side of the compromise in 1976. The form was the compulsory
licensing law in §111. As a settlement, it on the one hand, it allowed the cable
systems to continue their basic means of doing business: retransmission of
broadcast programs. Yet in exchange cable systems agreed to pay royalties on
imported signals,118 not to alter the content or advertising of the signals it
retransmitted,119 and to retransmit programs simultaneously with the broadcast.120
In short, the licensing scheme mapped the existing business practices of cable
companies, and added liabilities to it. The extent of these liabilities was to be
determined by a new statutory creation, the Copyright Royalty Tribunal.121
In the last stage of the 1970s settlement, the Federal Communications
repealed most of the remaining regulation of the cable industry. By January 1,
1978, as the copyright system came into force, the core remaining limitations of
the old regime remained the “distant-signal” limitations, which limited the
import of programming into large (top 100) television markets,122 and the
syndicated exclusivity rules, which gave local stations in urban areas to force cable
to black-out programs to which it had purchased exclusive exhibition rights.123
Together, these two rules continued to limit cable’s exploitation of urban
markets.
In 1980, the FCC announced the repeal of these regulations124. It
concluded that the absence of evidence of economic harm, and the new copyright
scheme had eliminated any need for its copyright “surrogates.”125 With this
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decision, the replacement of prohibitive FCC regulations with copyright liability
was essentially complete.126
Assessment
The story of the conflict between cable and broadcast is complicated
immensely by the overlap of FCC regulation and copyright. Nonetheless, the
history at minimum demonstrates the role copyright played in the settlement and
management of the disputes.
It is hard to argue that copyright’s role in the cable / broadcast conflict has
been a great success. On the one hand, the substitute of the copyright system
for FCC regulations led to a era of great growth both for the cable industry and
broadcasting networks.127 though the latter increasingly were forced to accept
cable’s dominant role in the dissemination of programming. In this respect, the
system has succeeded.
But the copyright settlement did end regulatory battles between the
parties. The copyright royalty tribunal, for example, attracted enormous
litigation in its setting of fees.128 Broadcasters in the late 1980s successfully
convinced Congress to reinstate some of the regulations that the FCC had
dropped in the late 1970s and 1980. For example, Congress recreated the
retransmission consent rule, giving broadcasters, for the first time, a clear
property right in their signals.
Yet at this stage these conflicts, however, are between mature industries.
The example of the 1992 retransmission consent rules is telling. Had the courts
granted broadcasters such rights in 1961 (as common-law unfair competition
rights) the rights would have put cable development in the control of
broadcasters. Granted the same right in 1992, the cable networks refused to
pay a cent for retransmission consent. The networks capitulated, demonstrating
cable’s new role as the dominant television disseminator.
Conclusion
Copyright’s role in communications policy is not exactly unknown to
copyright theorist, but rather lies neglected in favor of ever more sophisticated
authorship theories. The purpose of this article has been to stress the
possibilities and benefits of a communications-centered copyright theory.
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